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NEGLIGENT DRIVING RENDERS CAR OWNER
LIABLE TO WIFE
Plaintiff wife brought suit against her husband's employer for personal
injuries resulting from an automobile accident. The plaintiff was a
passenger in the employer's car, driven by her husband on a purely personal
mission with the consent of the owner. From a dismissal of the complaint,
based on grounds of public policy, the plaintiff appeals. Held, reversed,
the immunity of the husband from liability does not extend to the owner
of the automobile, whose liability is based upon the doctrine of respondeat
superior arising fron the principal and agent relationship implied in law.
May v. Palm Beach Chemical Company, Inc., 77 So.2d 468 (Fla. 1955). 1
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a master is liable for the
injuries caused by the tortious acts of his servants acting within the scope
of their employment? In some jurisdictions," a notable exception to this
general rule exists. This exception arises when the negligent servant is
the husband of the plaintiff, the rationale being that the master should
not be liable where his servant is not liable. 4 The reason given for this
exception is that at common law husband and wife are in legal contenpla-
tion but one person, and the husband is that person.5  Neither can, in
the absence of statute, maintain an action in tort against the other.6
The common law identity of the husband and wife and the consequent
disabilities of the wife remained until the advent of the various Married
Women's (Property) Acts 7 which allowed the wife to sue in her own
1. The plaintiff must prove her husband was grossly negligent in order to
recover under Iorida's Guest Statute: FLA. SrAT. 320.59 (1953).
2. RSrATEME1-Wr, AG;ENCY § 219 (1)(1933); 2 Am. Jur. Agency §§ 359, 360
(1936); 3 C.J.S. Agency § 255 (1936).
3. Maine v. J. Maine & Sons Co., 198 Iowa 1278, 201 N.W. 20 (1924); Sacknoff
v. Sacknoff, 131 Me. 280, 161 Atl. 669 (1932); Riser v. Riser, 240 Mich. 402, 215 NW.
290 (1927); Emerson v. Vestern Seed and Irrigation Co., 116 Neb. 180, 216 N.W.
297 (1927).
4. See note 3 supra. In Maine v. J. Maine & Sons Co., the court refused to
allow the wife to recover from her husband's employer in spite of iowA Con. § 5026,(1924), which provided that where damage is done by a car driven with the consent
of the owner, by reason of the negligence of the driver, the owner shall be liable.
5. 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife, § 5 (1944).
6. 30 C.J., Husband and Wife, § 317 (1923).
7. Ti'hree representative statutes have been chosen for comparison. Note that
District of Columbia and Florida Statutes remove many disabilities although the
unqualified right for either spouse to sue the court is not given. I).C. CODE, § 1155(1901) entitled "Power of Wife to Trade and Sue and Be Sted."
.. .and or torts committed against them, as filly and freely as if they
were unmarried; contracts may also be made with them, and they may
also be sued separately on their contracts, whether made before or during
marriage, and for wrong independent of contract committed by them before
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name under certain conditions. In Thompson v. Thompson,' a Federal
court gave such a statute a narrow construction and refused to allow the
wife to sue her husband in a tort action for assault and battery.9 On the
other hand, Connecticut has liberally interpreted", its statute1' and allowed
the wife to maintain a suit for a personal tort'against her husband, using
the revolutionary change wrought by the statute as the basis for its
decision.' 2  However, the majority"5 and Florida' 4 view comes within the
Thompson doctrine.
When a wife seeks recover), from her husband's employer under the
doctrine of respondeat superior, the legal liabilities of the parties are most
simply15 described by the Restatement of Agency.'0  That is, in jurisdictions
where the husband and wife cannot sue each other for personal tort,
or during marriage as if they were fully unmarried, and upon judgments ...
as if they were unmarried ....
FLA. STAT. 708.08 (1953) entitled "Married Women's Rights"; separate property:
Every married woman is hereby empowered to take charge of, and
manage and control her separate property, to contract and be contracted
with, to sue and be sued, and to sell . . .without restraint, without joinder
of her husband, in all respects as fully as if she were unmarried ...; ;
provided, however, that no deed, mortgage .. .conveying or encumbering
real property owned by a married woman shall be valid without the joinder
of her husband; provided further, that any claim against a married woman
shall not be a claim or lien against such married woman's right of dower
in her husband's separate property.
The law in New York is clear: N.Y. I)oMEs-rc RELATtoNs LAw § 57 (1937)
entitled "Right of Action by or Against Married Woman, and by Husband or WVife
Against the Other, for Torts" provides:
A married woman has a right of action for an injury to her person.
property or character or for an injury arising out of the marital relation,
as if unmarried. She is liable for her wrongful or tortious acts; her
husband is not liable for such acts unless they were done by his actual
coercion or instigation; and such coercion or instigation shall not be
presumed, but must be proved. A married woman has a right of action
against her husband for his wrongful or tortious acts resulting to her in
any personal injury as defined in section thirty-seven-a of the general con-
struction law, or resulting in injury to her property, as if unmarried, and
she is liable to her husband for her wrongful or tortious acts resulting in
any such personal injury to her husband or to his property, as if they
were unmarried.
8. 218 U.S. 611 (1910).
9. A strong dissent in the Thompson case, note 8 supra, argued that the statute
gave the wife the right to maintain an action for a personal tort against her husband,
10. Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 Atl. 889 (1914); accord, in Bushnell v.
Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 At]. 432 (1925). For similar holdings see Roberts v.
Roberts, 185 N.C. 566, 118 S.E. 9 (1923); TWait v. Pierce, 191 Vis. 202, 209 N.W.
475 (1926).
11. CONNECTICUT MARRIED WOMEN'S ACT C. 114 (1877).
12. See note 10 supra.
13. Rogers v. Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 177 S.W. 382 (1915); Woltman v. Woltman,
153 Minn. 217, 189 N.W. 1022 (1922); Austin v. Austin, 130 Miss. 61, 100 So. 591
(1924); Harvey v. Harvey, 239 Mich 142, 214 N.W. 305 (1927); Thompson v.
Thompson, note 8 supra; see note 3 supra.
14. Corren v. Corren, 47 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1950).
15. Some terms used to describe the theory of the master's liability: derivately,
theory of subrogation, imported, vicarious, constructive, imputed, imposed. See 6
N.Y.U.L. REV. 53, 55 (1928).
16. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 217(2)(1933):
(2)A master or other principal is not liable for facts of a servant or other
agent which the agent is privileged to do although the principal himself
would not be so privileged; but he may be liable for an at to which the
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an immunity exists which may' 7 or may not' s extend to the employer.
Where the immunity is extended, the reason given by the courts is that
a spouse should not be allowed to do indirectly what cannot be done
directly, i.e., sue the employer who would in turn sue the tort feasor
husband. 1 In jurisdictions where immunity is not extended, the maxim
Qui facit per alium facit per se governs, 201 the unity of the husband and
wife being disregarded if recovery may be had over against the husband.
The conflicting legal principles of the two opposing views were resolved
by Cardozo, C.J. in Schubert v. A. Schubert Wagon C0.20% in these words:
We find no collision between the principle of liability [based
on respondeat superior] established in this case and the principle
of exemption established in actions against a husband. If such a
collision, however, could be found, with the result that one or
the other principle must yield, we agree with Hubbs, P.J., writing
in the court below, that the exemption would have to give way
as an exception, more or less anomalous, to a responsibility which
today must be accepted as a general rule.
agent has a personal immunity frorn suit. (emphasis supplied)
Comment: b. If a principal has a personal privilege which cannot be shared
by another, he cannot of course confer this privilege upon an agent so as
to escape liability for the agent's act. Thus, if a master has a privilege
of personally entering a clubhouse, he may become liable for the entry
therein by his servant upon his business. Likewise, if an agent has an
immunity from liability as distinguished from a privilege of acting, the
principal does not share the immunity. Thus, if a servant, while acting
within the scope of employment, negligently injures his wife, the master
is subject to liability (emphasis supplied)
17. See note 3 supra.
18. The reader is referred to the following cases which held that a wife could
recover from her husband's employer for injuries she received as a result of her husband's
negligent driving of his employer's automobile within the scope of employment: 1'ittsley
v. David, 298 Mass. 552, I1 N.E.2d 461 (1937); McLaurin v. McLaurin Furniture
Co., 166 Miss. 180, 146 So. 877 (1933). But the husband was held not the alter ego
of the employer when the wife was riding for her own pleasure with the husband
on a business trip; Mullally v. Langenberg Bros. Grain Co., 339 Mo. 582, 98 S.&W.2d
645 (1936); Miltimore v. Milford Motor Co., 89 N.H. 272, 197 AtI. 330 (1938);
Cerruti v. Simone, 13 N.J. Misc. 466, 179 Atl. 257 (1935); Schubert v. A. Schubert
Wagon Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Huff,
48 Ohio App. 412, 194 N.E. 429 (1933), Rev'd on another grounds, 128 Ohio St. 469,
191 N.E. 761 (1934); Koontz v. Messer, 320 Pa. 487, 181 Atl. 792 (1935); Ponlin
v. Graham, 102 Vt. 307, 147 Ati. 698 (1929); Hensel v. Hensel Yellow Cab Co., 209
Wis. 489, 245 N.W. 159 (1932) (governed by the law of Ohio); LeSage v. LeSage,
224 Wis. 57, 271 N.W. 369 (1937).
19. Since an agent is personally liable for the torts he commits, 3 C.J.S., Agency
§ 220 (1936). Other reasons based on public policy are as follows:
1. Pointless extra litigation will be required. See Seaboard Airline Ry.
Co. v. American District Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330, 143 So. 316(1932);
Losito v. Kruse, 136 Ohio St. 183, 24 N.E. 2d 705(1940).
2. Domestic collusion and fraud will be encouraged. See note 3 supra.
3. A legislative enactment should be the basis of recovery. See Welch v.
Davis, 410 Ill. 130, 101 N.E. 2d 547(1951). Zinman v. Newman, 51
N.Y.S. 2d 132(1942); aff'd 265 App. Div. 1052, 41 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1943);
General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Morgan, 33 F. Supp.
190(D.C.N.Y. 1940).
20. "He who acts through another acts himself." [i.e., the acts of an agent are
the acts of the principal] BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY (1941).
20a. Supra note 18.
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The Florida Supreme Court first came to grips with an issue similar
to the May case ini ebster v. Sn'der.*' In that case the plaintiff sued
the owner of an automobile and the driver-servant for injuries received
through its negligent operation while driven within the scope of employ-
mcnt. The plaintiff married the driver (the owner's son) after the suit
had started but before it came to judgment. The court abated the action
against the driver (now husband) on the theory of the common law
identity of husband and wife but allowed the action against the owner
to continue. As the liability of the parties was fixed at the time of the
accident when the plaintiff and the driver were not married, the issue in
the May case did not arise.
An additional difficulty in the May case is that the husband's activity
was without the scope of his employment,22 as the tort occurred on a
purely personal mission. To bridge this hiatus, the court invoked the well-
established Florida Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine as applied to auto-
mobiles."3  Although the doctrine was founded by judicial decision, 24 legis-
lative approval might be implied.2
The May decision has two principal effects: first, it brings Florida law
into accord with the Restatement of Agency (and majority) view in holding
the employer liable to the employee's spouse for torts of his employee.
Secondly, it reaffirms and extends the application of the Florida Dangerous
Instrumentality Doctrine as applied to Automobiles.
ROBERT J. STAMPFL
21. 103 Fla. 1131, 138 So. 755 (1932).
22. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 219 (2) (1933): "A master is not liable for the
tortious conduct of servants acting outside the scope of employment."
23. Other jurisdictions have imposed liability on the car owner by statute: CAL.
VEHICLE CooE § 402 (1937):
Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for the death
of or injury to person or property resulting from negligence in the operation
of such motor vehicle, in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any
person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied,
of such owner, and the negligence of such person shall be imputed to
the owner for all purposes of civil damages ....
N. V. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 59 (1941):
Negligence of operator other than owner attributable to owner.
Every owner of a motor vehicle or motor cycle operated upon a public
highway shall be liable and responsible for death or injuries to person or
property resnlting from the negligence in the operation of such motor
vehicle or motor cycle, in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any
person legally using or operating the same with the permission, express or
implied, of such owner ....
24. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fta. 441, 86 So, 629 (1920); lerr
v. Butler, 101 Fla. 1125, 132 So. 815 (1931); Englenian v. Traeger, 102 FIa. 756, 136
So. 527 (1931). For complete analysis see 5 FLA. LAw. Rnv. 412 (1952), this doctrine
makes. the driver of the car the owner's agent if the owner's consent to its use has
been obtained.
25. FLA. SrAT. 51.12 (1953).
